Ever since 2016, questions of policy divergence and alignment in Northern Ireland have been simmering in the background, with a few moments (sausage wars! arsenic in cake!) nearing boiling point. In this short post I suggest that three elections in the last few weeks, in the EU, in the UK and in France, are creating a new context for divergence and alignment. Taking as an example the environment and agriculture sectors, these elections raise the likelihood that London, not Brussels, will become the more ambitious partner. What will this mean for Northern Ireland? To address this complex question, the blog post first discusses the likely policy consequences of UK and EU (plus French) elections before discussing what this could mean for Northern Ireland.
When you go your way and I go mine – are the UK and EU drifting further apart?
The European Parliament elections taking place 6–9 June saw a victory for the traditional right–wing European People Party, which remains the biggest party in the European Parliament (with 190 out of 720). Its main rival, the traditional left–wing group Socialist & Democrats lost 3 seats to 136. Ahead of the vote, two main changes were expected: first, a rise of the far right, second, a squeeze of the centre, both the Renew Europe group and the Greens. The first of those two did not fully materialise beyond a few countries, like France and Italy (the two main far right groups now total 134 seats together, +16). But the second did happen: centrists lost 20 seats and greens 19. The Parliament is thus more divided and polarised.
This shift to the right puts Europe’s “man on the moon” moment – its European Green Deal and commitment to becoming the first climate neutral continent by 2050 – at risk. The low hanging fruits of climate and environmental actions have already been picked in the EU – what remains to be done is difficult, costly and often unpopular. Two sectors so far have done much less than others – transport and agriculture, with emissions either rising or stagnating since 2000. If the EU is to meet its 2050 climate targets and halt the loss of biodiversity it will need to profoundly change how European move and what and how they farm. Yet the elections make this very unlikely – both the EPP and the far right have campaigned for less environmentally friendly agriculture policy and have proven resistant to moving away from the combustion engine.
The elections to the French parliament and the resulting divisions (a stronger far right yes, but also a much stronger left and a weakening centre bloc) mean any resulting government would be weak and unwilling to rock the boat and argue for the EU to profoundly green farming. Beyond specific policies, the pace of policy development in Brussels has ground to a halt – not only does the new EP and future Commission need time to get started, but Hungary holds the 6–month rotating Council Presidency and has been so disruptive that other Member States are talking of boycotting meetings it organises.
Meanwhile in the UK the Labour landslide has been followed up by very swift decisions on climate change, with a commitment to regain international leadership, lifting some bans (on wind turbines on land) and starting others (on new North Sea oil drilling). We have conversely heard much less about farming or broader environmental issues – but considering what is happening in the EU, even if the UK were to stand still it may emerge more ambitious. Where does this leave NI?
Regulatory divergence in Northern Ireland: aligning with whom, for what?
Due to both the devolution settlement and the Windsor Framework, discussions about divergence and alignment in NI are quite complex: the question is not just whether divergence or alignment will occur, but with whom? For how long? And is it a matter of choice or a legal requirement? Even thinking in terms of East/West and North/South as directions of alignment (or divergence) tends to undersell the complexity. The ‘East’ in many areas of regulatory competence is not united: Scotland and Wales may have very different policy preferences than the UK government acting for England. Which version of ‘the East’ should NI align with?
Similarly, recent EU policies on energy or agriculture have given much more leeway to member states to go their own way in implementing shared, and often flexible objectives. Even if NI ‘has to’ or chooses to align with the EU, it would not have to do so in line with how the Republic of Ireland chooses to. Hence, we are not facing a question of divergence, or as others are calling it, ‘trivergence‘, but an even murkier and uncertain situation of ‘polyvergence’ where the NI Executive and stakeholders in NI will be faced with a great number of options to pick and mix from.
In a few notable cases the options will be limited – areas covered by the Windsor framework, areas where the UK government uses the UK Internal Market Act to hollow out devolved competence – but in many others, NI will be free to choose, or develop its own home–grown alternatives. Finally, divergence or alignment will not always (or indeed, often) be driven by actions taken in NI. It takes two – or in this case many more – to tango. Governments in the UK and across the European Union are adopting policies constantly: divergence can be born of NI inaction as much as action. Alignment is not a permanent state, but something, if desired, which has to be committed to time and time again through frequent regulatory reform – something which the Scottish government, for example, is struggling to deliver on.
A purposeful approach to divergence and alignment
Recent elections are upending two common assumptions when it comes to UK–EU and UK intergovernmental relations since the referendum. Firstly, stability and certainty are now found on this side of the channel, and in Westminster in particular. After years of political instability in the UK, the UK now has a government with a very large majority, while the EU is dealing with a fractured Parliament and weak/no government in key states. Meanwhile, both Scotland and Wales are going through a phase of First Minister instability. Second, environmental ambition may also be stronger in Westminster – although this needs to be confirmed whether it expands beyond climate and energy. For Northern Ireland, this offers some breathing space – a disorganised EU is much less likely to adopt new policies falling under the Windsor Framework – and new avenues, through the Starmer’s proposed new ‘council of nations and regions’ for fruitful engagement with the rest of the UK. Critically, these shifts move us from a discussion on alignment of what NI has to do, and what it could choose to do. This offers NI a critical, but double–edged, opportunity: picking and choosing policy because it is ‘good’ and suited for NI – not because it aligns or diverges from a specific place, but on its own merit… and having no one to blame but ourselves if that policy does not work out.
Dr Viviane Gravey is Senior Lecturer in European Politics in the School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics at Queen’s University Belfast. She co–chairs the Brexit & Environment network and is part of the leadership team of the ESRC Centre for Inclusive Trade Policy.
